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I study how mutual funds invest in public firms where founding family 
members retain a significant portion of shares.  Specifically, I explore the 
performance of actively managed U.S. mutual funds that heavily concentrate 
their holdings in family firms from 2001 to 2010. The findings indicate that 
these concentrated funds outperform other funds that hold more diversified 
portfolios.  Moreover, trading by these concentrated funds prior to family firms’ 
earnings announcements is highly profitable, consistent with the notion that 
these funds are better informed. I also find that information advantages of these 
concentrated funds decreased after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), which 
improved quality and quantity of corporate disclosure. These concentrated 
funds have higher stock selectivity, higher industry concentration, higher 
return gap, and closer geographical distance to stocks in fund portfolio than 
other funds. However, the skill of these concentrated funds is not fully 
explained by any of these existing skill indicators, suggesting that fund 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Hypothesis Development 
In recent years, firms’ ownership structure has been extensively explored in 
corporate finance literature, whereas the ownership preferences of outside investors 
receive much less attention. From the viewpoint of institutional investors, firm 
ownership matters when deciding which firm should be added to their portfolios, 
since ownership structure impacts firm characteristics such as corporate governance 
mechanisms, disclosure policies and management styles (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2009; Mullins and 
Schoar, 2014). However, despite its recognized importance, there is little evidence 
concerning how institutional investors assess and respond to ownership structure. 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks’s (2010) survey of 118 institutional investors offers a 
noteworthy exception. When asked to assess how important they consider different 
corporate governance and control devices to be when making investment decisions, 
over half of these institutional investors agree that ownership structures play an 
important or very important role.  
I study the holdings of actively managed equity mutual funds in U.S. firms, 
focusing on their portfolio holdings in family-controlled public firms. Perez-Gonzalez 
(2006) notes the pervasiveness and prominence of family ownership in publicly 
traded U.S. firms while Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report that families control about 
one-third of Fortune 500 firms. Following prior ownership literature (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), I define family firms as firms in which 
founding family members own at least five percent of shares. Exploring how 
individual mutual funds invest in family firms illuminates an important facet of 
capital allocation across asset classes in the money-management industry.  
Family firms have a few unique information structures that allow them to attract 
informed mutual funds. First, CEOs of family firms have much longer tenure than 
CEOs of other firms with diffuse ownership. The long service of family firm CEOs 
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enables mutual funds, especially skilled funds, to acquire information from longer 
CEO track record. Skilled funds may also have stronger incentive to pay information 
acquisition cost because they would benefit longer from their private information due 
to the stable management of family firms; Second, family firms have a unique group 
of “insider”, family members, who may not necessarily work for the firm but still 
have access to private firm information through family ties. The existence of family 
firms provides skilled funds an additional channel to benefit from the information 
leakage from family firms to outside investors (Anderson et al. (2012) argue that 
family members facilitate information leakage to short sellers); Third, family firms 
normally make less voluntary disclosure because family owners better monitoring 
managers and, due to substitutive relation between direct monitoring and public 
disclosure as argued by Bushman et al. (2004),  the demand for information from 
nonfamily owners to monitor managers is lower.  
I find significant cross-sectional variations in individual funds’ holdings of 
family firms. Some fund managers seems to persistently concentrate their portfolios 
in family firms. Conventional wisdom suggests that investors should widely diversify 
their holdings to reduce portfolio risks. Fund managers, however, might hold 
concentrated positions in securities where they have information advantage. The 
opaque nature of family firms makes them a greener pasture for institutional investors 
(Anderson, Duru and Reeb, 2009; Marffett, 2012). Consistent with this hypothesis 
based on information, we would expect fund managers that hold concentrated 
positions in family firms to be skilled managers. As a result, we should observe a 
positive relation between fund performance and portfolio concentration in family 
firms. This hypothesis is consistent with theoretical work about informed investors’ 
investment choices by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). 
This hypothesis is also consistent with recent anecdotal evidence that some fund 
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managers have family firm-specific stock-picking skills and overweigh family firms 
in their fund portfolio: 
“Mr. Bendahan’s funds favor companies in which a founding family retains a 
significant stake (his Selection Fund has a 67 percent weighting to these companies), 
an approach that appears to be paying off… Selection Fund has annualized returns 
of 36.8 per cent, against 22.6 per cent for the benchmark… “Family-owned 
businesses often fly under the radar… (Family firms) don’t tend to be terribly 
aggressive on roadshows. In some cases they wait for investors to come and see 
them.”                
          ---“Swiss chief reveals ‘family’ secret” – Financial Times, March , 2013 
Alternatively, mutual fund managers may also hold concentrated positions in 
family firms because of the convex performance-flow relation documented by prior 
studies, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998). In other words, fund investors reward 
mutual funds with favorable fund inflows for superior fund performance, but do not 
penalize poor fund performance equally. This asymmetric payoff function may 
incentivize some fund managers, especially those with poor investment skills, to 
pursue extreme strategies in order to have a better chance of achieving stellar 
performance. Consistent with this non-information hypothesis, fund managers hold 
concentrated positions due to a potential conflict of interest between fund managers 
and investor. As a result, we should not expect a positive relation between fund 
performance and portfolio concentration in family firms. 
Using a panel of nearly 2,100 actively managed U.S. equity funds over the 
period from 2001 to 2010, I find a significant and positive relation between fund 
performance and portfolio concentration in family firms. My result suggests that, 
funds that concentrate their holdings in family firms outperform other funds 
controlling for the mutual fund common characteristics. The magnitude of 
outperformance is economically significant: concentrated funds—funds in the top 
decile of portfolio holdings in family firm—outperform other funds by 2.78 
percentage points per year in style-adjusted return. The outperformance also shows up 
4 
 
in risk-adjusted fund returns: 0.82 percentage points per year in four-factor alpha, or 
0.77 percentage points per year in five-factor alpha. I separately sort fund holdings 
within each Lipper fund style to mitigate concerns that the superior performance of 
concentrated fund is driven by fund style effect. 
While the results appear consistent with the idea of superior fund investment 
skills (i.e., consistent with the information-hypothesis), the observed positive 
association between concentrated holdings in family firms and subsequent fund 
abnormal returns may also be driven by superior returns from non-family firms in the 
fund portfolio. To discriminate between this alternative explanations and information 
hypothesis, I investigate the causes of abnormal returns of concentrated portfolios. 
The information hypothesis indicates that funds should perform better in positions 
where they plausibly obtain privileged information. I decompose abnormal fund 
return into return based on holdings of family firms and return based on holdings of 
non-family firms. I find that concentrated funds earn similar abnormal returns from 
their holdings of non-family firms with other funds. In contrast, consistent with the 
information hypothesis, concentrated funds earn higher four-factor and five-factor 
risk-adjusted returns from their holdings of family firms than other funds.  
Moreover, I look at concentrated funds’ trading prior to earnings announcements 
to uncover how they generate abnormal returns. Using daily institutional trading data, 
I observe that concentrated funds’ trading in three days prior to earnings 
announcements is highly profitable, especially for trading in family firms. I find that 
concentrated funds’ trading prior to earnings announcements predicts the earnings 
surprise and the earnings announcement returns well. In contrast, trading by other 
funds prior to earnings announcements does not have such predictive power. 
I also study how information advantages of concentrated funds change as public 
information environment changes. I use passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002 that 
5 
 
improves quality and quantity of corporate disclosures as a negative shock to 
informed investors’ information advantage. I find that concentrated funds earn larger 
profit before the passage of the SOX Act.  
As a robustness check, I study which types of family firms account more for the 
positive relation between fund performance and portfolio concentration in family 
firms. Privileged information is more valuable to institutional investors when stocks 
have higher information asymmetry. Consistent with the information hypothesis, I 
find that concentration in opaque family firms is more related to fund performance. In 
addition, I compare indicators of investment skill of fund managers in prior literature 
for funds that holding concentrated position in family firms and other funds. I find 
that funds that concentrate their holdings in family firms have higher industry 
concentration and return gap, and outperformance of these funds is especially strong 
among funds with high industry concentration. In unreported table, I also show that 
the skill of concentrated funds is not dominated by the geographical distance based 
skill (e.g., Coval et al. 2001) and education connection based skills (e.g., Cohen et al. 
2008). 
While the information hypothesis explains why some fund managers hold 
concentrated positions in family firms, the fact that some funds maintain low level 
holdings in family firms is not fully explained by informational reasons. I observe a 
convex relation between portfolio holdings in family firms and fund performance. 
After fund holdings in family firms drop below the median level for funds with the 
same fund style, further decreases in the fund holdings in family firms are not 
associated with worse fund performance. I posit that organizational structure of 
mutual funds play a role in explaining why some fund managers hold relative few 
family firms comparing to other funds with the same fund style. I find that more 
cautious funds, i.e., funds affiliated with larger fund families, funds affiliated with a 
6 
 
commercial lending conglomerate, funds offering an institutional class,
 1
 hold fewer 
family firm positions than other funds. Governance-related concerns aside, the control 
right of funds seems also play a role in shaping funds’ holdings of family firms: team-
managed funds hold fewer family firms than single-manager funds (e.g., Almazan et 
al., 2004; Dass et al., 2013). 
This paper draws on the insights of a large literature in corporate finance on 
ownership and corporate opacity. A point crucial to my reasoning: family firms 
controlled by either founders or heirs, especially those outside of the S&P 500 index, 
have significantly higher opacity than diffuse shareholder firms (Anderson et al., 
2009; Ali et al., 2007). The shared nature of high opacity of family firms enables me 
to study a general problem faced by potential outsider investors. As the quoted 
anecdotal evidence suggests, the low profile, thereby high opacity, of family firms 
leaves room for skilled investors to gather private information.  
This study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, I provide 
evidence of sophisticated informed trading in family firms by concentrated mutual 
funds. More specifically, I find that concentrated funds earn sizeable profits by 
building long positions in family firms before firms release good news. My result 
confirms a basic prediction from an extended rational expectation equilibrium model, 
based on Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kacperczyk and Seru (2007): informed 
investors hold more good securities than uninformed investors, especially in securities 
with higher information asymmetry. I conduct a variety of supplementary tests to 
show that the superior fund returns arise from investment skill rather by alternative 
explanations. My results also add to the literature about diffusion of firm-specific 
information for family firms. Family firms may have a variety of linkages that could 
facilitate information leakage documented by Anderson et al. (2012). Although my 
                                                          
1
 McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010) show that larger financial institutions are more 
sensitive to corporate governance and control issues;  Sias, and Starks (2003) report that a 
commercial lending conglomerate is more concerned about holding prudent securities. 
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data does not allow for examination of the mechanism of information gathering by 
these sophisticated fund managers, the results suggest that well-informed 
concentrated funds indeed profit from the private information about the firm. 
Second, the analysis provides compelling evidence that cautious funds hold less 
family firms in their portfolios, perhaps due to concerns about the potential of 
expropriation by large controlling family shareholders. I identify cautious funds as 
those affiliated with larger fund families, or funds affiliated with a commercial 
lending conglomerate, or funds offering an institutional class. This paper documents a 
distortion effect of the prudent-man rule on mutual funds investment that receives 
little attention in the literature. Unlike other institutions governed by common law or 
the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (e.g., bank trusts and pension funds), 
mutual funds possess broader investment flexibility and lower prudence standard 
(Guercio (1996)). One potential effect of the prudent-man rule centers on the cross-
institutional effect to economically linked mutual funds. Consistent with this 
conjecture, I find that funds affiliated with banks or funds offering shares to 
institutional investors refrain from investing heavily in family firms. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section I describes the data. Section II 




Chapter 2 Data and Summary Statistics 
A. Data Description 
The main data starts from merging family firm data with the CRSP Survivorship 
Bias Free Mutual Fund Database, the CDA/Spectrum holdings database, and the 
CRSP stock price data. I also use daily institutional trading data from Abel/Noser 
database to conduct a supplementary test. The family firm data is described in detail 
in Anderson, Reeb and Zhao (2012). This paper uses an extended version of the firm 
ownership data spanning from 2001 to 2010.  Family firms are defined as firms in 
which founding family members own at least five percent of shares. The fraction of 
uncertain words in 10-K filings is deduced from the data offered by Loughran and 
Mcdonald (2011). Firms’ business segment data is obtained from COMPSTAT 
Segment files. Education profile of firm board member is obtained from BoardEx 
database. 
Since active equity trading is of interest, I use only domestic equity funds and 
exclude index funds and bond funds.
2
  Mutual funds must further satisfy the 
following criteria: First, the funds must have at least 24 months of non-missing 
returns. Second, the funds must have TNA greater than five million USD at the start 
of each fiscal year. For funds with multiple classes, I combine the different classes 
into a single fund. Specifically, I compute the net asset value weighted average of the 
class-level data items.  I infer whether a fund is managed by a team from the fund 
manager names. To examine whether a fund is affiliated with commercial banking 
companies, I search the profile for each fund family through Google, 
businessweek.com, etc. 
                                                          
2
 Funds with Lipper objective codes EI, EIEI, ELCC, G, GI, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MC, 
MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, MR, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, SG, SPSP, 
MTAG, B, EMN, I, and LSE are retained as equity funds. 
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Overall, my mutual fund sample includes 74,995 fund-quarter observations 
spanning from 2001 to 2010.  
B. Variables and Summary Statistics 
For each quarter, the fund level dollar investment in each stock is calculated 
using the start of period holding information and average of monthly price in the 
quarter. Then I calculate the dollars invested in the family firms as a fraction of fund 
investment in the 2000 stocks for which I can identify ownership structure. The 
fraction of holding invested in family firms, i.e., FF holding, for fund i in quarter q 
equals 
𝐹𝐹 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑞 =
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑞| 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑗∈𝑆𝑖&𝑗∈𝐹𝐷
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑞𝑗∈𝑆𝑖&𝑗∈𝐹𝐷
,    (1) 
where 𝑆𝑖  is the set of stocks held by fund i in quarter q, FD is the set of stocks 
covered by the family firm database. To measure how a fund places relatively large 
bets in family firms given its stated investment style, I rank FF holding within the 
same fund style (Lipper classes) and within the same quarter. Concentrated is an 
indicator of whether funds are in the top decile, otherwise this equals zero. 
I calculate three mutual fund return-based performance measures: abnormal 
returns adjusted by mutual fund style average, abnormal return using Fama-French-
Carhart 4 factor model, and 5 factor model using FFC factors and an additional 
liquidity factor by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Factor loadings are estimated using 
past 24 monthly fund returns on a rolling basis. To look at the trading profit of mutual 
funds, I also calculate the return based on the stocks held by mutual funds using start 
of period holding information. The holding return is the return of funds assuming the 
fund holds start of period position throughout the quarter. I first calculate four-factor 
and five-factor alpha for each stock. Using dollars invested in each stock by a fund at 
the start of quarter as weights, I calculate the fund alpha based on holdings. To get 
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stock alpha, I use factor loadings estimated using the previous 24 monthly stock 
returns on a rolling basis. I calculate holding return separately for family firms and 
non-family firms. Expense is the fund expense ratio per annum. Turnover is the 
minimum of aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by the 
average TNA. Total load is the sum of front-end and rear-end load fees. Team-
Managed Fund Dummy is an indicator that equals one if the fund is managed by a 
team, and equals zero if the fund is managed by a solo manager. Has Institutional-
Class Dummy equals one if the fund has an institutional class, otherwise it equals zero. 
Owned By Banks Dummy equals one if the fund is affiliated with a commercial bank, 
otherwise it equals zero. Fund age gives the age of funds. For the funds with multiple 
classes, I take the age of the oldest share class. Size Score, Value Score, Mom Score, 
Beta Score and Illiquidity Score are average quintile ranks of size, book-to-market 
ratio, momentum, beta and Amihud illiquidity measure for portfolio stocks (one for 
the lowest, and five for the highest). 
Table 1 panel A shows the summary statistics of the main variables. The mean 
and median of fraction of fund holdings invested in family firms, FF holding, are 23.7% 
and 22.0%, respectively. Panel B presents a univariate comparison of fund 
characteristics based on their holdings in family firms. Compared with other funds, 
funds overweighting family firms (ranking in the top decile of holdings) are less 
likely to be managed by a team, less likely to have institutional class, less likely to be 
owned by commercial banking companies, and are affiliated with smaller fund family 
complexes. Meanwhile, there is a significant difference in the holding pattern of two 
types of funds. Funds overweighting family firms hold fewer stocks in their portfolios; 
the stocks they hold tend to be smaller in size, have higher M/B score, with inferior 
prior returns (loser stocks), have lower beta, and higher illiquidity. Though all the 
differences are statistically significant, only the differences in size and illiquidity 
measures are economically significant (-0.232 and 0.244). The differences (e.g., size 
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score and illiquidity score) of portfolio stocks characteristics, between fund 
overweighing family firms and other funds, are consistent with the fact that family 
firms are smaller in size and more opaque. 
 I calculate the average geographical distance between fund and stocks it holds. 
Log (Firm-Firm Distance) is the log of value-weighted average distance from fund to 
all firms held by the fund (use dollar fund holdings in each stock as weight). I find 
that concentrated funds are geographically closer to stocks they hold than other funds. 
In unreported table, I calculate the fund-firm distance separately for family firms and 
non-family firms. I find that concentrated funds are closer to (non-) family firms 
stocks in their portfolios than other funds. 
I also calculate the fraction of fund holdings in firms that have an education-
based connection with the funds. If at least one of board member has graduated from 
the same university with the fund manager then this firm is regarded as a connected 
firm for this fund. I calculate the fraction of fund total net asset invested in such 
education-connected firms.  Fraction of Edu Connected holdings is the fraction of 
fund TNA invested in firms connected with the fund via common education 
background between fund manager and at least one of firm senior executives (only for 
solo-manager funds). I find that concentrated funds have similar education-based 
connection with stocks it holds compared with other funds.  
Table 1 panel C presents the correlation matrix. Style adjusted FF holding is 
fraction of holding invested in family firms adjusted by the average value of funds 
within the same Lipper investment style and within the same quarter. The main 
variables of interest, Style adjusted FF holding and Concentrated Dummy, are in 
quarter q, while the return variables are in the subsequent quarter (q+1) and other 
fund level characteristics are lagged. The results show positive relation between Style 
adjusted FF holding (Concentrated) and return-based fund abnormal alpha, i.e., Style-
12 
 
ad Ret, FFC4 alpha and FFCP5 alpha, in the subsequent quarter. The relation 
between Style adjusted FF holding (Concentrated) with the fund holding abnormal 
return based on family firms is also positive but less significant. Consistent with the 
comparison of two fund groups in Table 1 panel B, I find similar pattern using 





Chapter 3 Empirical Results 
In this section, I briefly describe the design of main tests and interpret the empirical 
results.  
A. Funds’ Concentration in Family Firms and Subsequent Fund Performance 
In this section, I test main results suggested by the information hypothesis: Funds 
that overweight family firms have higher subsequent portfolio performance than other 
funds. I also conduct supplementary tests to provide additional evidence about 
investment skills by the concentrated funds.  
Subsection A.1 examines the relation between investment in family firms and 
subsequent fund abnormal returns. Subsection A.2 investigates whether the funds 
with concentrated positions in family firms could higher stock returns from family 
firms than other funds. Subsection A.3 studies, at the stock-level, whether the trade of 
funds overweighting family firms is really informative prior to earnings 
announcements. Subsection A.4 shows the fund performance in sub-periods around 
the passage of SOX Act. Subsection A.5 analyses the effect on fund performance by 
holdings in more opaque versus less opaque family firms.  
A.1. Fund Abnormal Returns 
The main prediction of the information hypothesis relates fund holdings in 
family firms to subsequent fund performance. In Table 2 panel A, I sort all the fund-
quarter observations within each Lipper style in each quarter into decile groups based 
on the fraction of investment in family firms, FF holding. I sort funds independently 
within each Lipper fund style, since there is considerable difference of holding in 
family firms for funds across styles,
3
 see Table A1 in the appendix. Independent 
                                                          
3
 For example, small cap funds hold more in family firms than large cap funds. 
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sorting within fund style better captures the extent a fund deviates from the normal 
level of holdings in family firms by its peer funds.  
I then report the Style-adj. return, FFC 4 factor alpha, and FFCP 5 factor alpha 
in the subsequent quarter for funds within each decile group. In the last row I present 
the difference of abnormal returns of the funds overweighting family firms (D10) and 
that of funds underweighting family firms (D1), and I find funds in the D10 group 
perform significantly better than those in the D1 group. It is worth noting that fund 
performance does not grow with the ranking monotonously. For example, the 
performance of funds in D10 is the highest, followed by funds in D5 and D9. The 
result suggests that fund managerial skill is manifested in funds’ concentrated 
positions in a certain investable equity class.  
Table 2 panel B shows the OLS results using subsequent fund abnormal returns 
as dependent variables. I estimate the following panel regression: 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗 𝑅𝑒𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝐶4, 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑃5)𝑖,𝑞+1 
= 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑞 
            +𝛽2𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜃𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞 .    
  (2)             
where 𝛿𝑞 and 𝜃𝑓  are time-fixed effects and funds’ style-fixed effects, respectively. 
Fund control includes fund turnover, expense, total loads, log (fund TNA) and log 
(Fund family TNA). In columns (1) and (4), the dependent variable is fund style-
adjusted return in the subsequent quarter. Funds overweighting family firms have 
superior performance among the peer funds in the same investment style. For 
example, in column (4), funds in the top decile of holdings in family firms have 0.232% 
higher return per month (or 2.78% per year) than funds with the same investment 
style. In columns (2) and (5), the dependent variable is a four-factor fund alpha using 
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the Fama-French-Carhart model. I find similar results though the magnitude of return 
difference is smaller; e.g., in column (5), the funds in the top decile of holding in 
family firms have 0.068% higher four-factor alpha per month (or 0.82% per year) 
than other funds. It is possible that the superior performance is due to the higher 
liquidity risk by overweighting illiquid stocks. In columns (3) and (6), I present the 
results using five-factor fund alpha as a dependent variable. I use the four-factors by 
Fama-French-Carhart and an additional liquidity factor by Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003). Compared with the results using four-factor alpha, the coefficient of our main 
variable is positive and significant though the magnitude of coefficient is smaller, 
e.g., in column (6) the funds in the top decile of holding in family firms have 0.064% 
higher four-factor alpha per month (or 0.77% per year) than other funds.  
In an unreported table (in appendix), I construct a fund-quarter sample using 
only passively managed index funds. In contrast, I do not find a significant relation 
between fund holding levels in family firms and subsequent abnormal returns. This 
result suggests that the superior returns of actively managed equity funds 
overweighting family firms should be ascribed to their investment skills rather than 
the mechanical effect of holding a particular class of equities. 
A.2. Holdings-based Performance Measures 
In Table 3, I analyze how the funds perform in the positions in family firms and 
non-family firms separately. I am interested in the driver of the outperformance of the 
funds that overweight family firms. I calculate the portfolio’s holding-based returns, 
using the stock positions of each fund at the start of period and the stock returns 
during the quarter. If a fund manager is skilled in investing family firms, he would 
overweight the family firms only when he predicts the family firms would achieve 
good return afterward. Thus, one would expect the fund holding return based on 
family firms should be higher for funds overweighting family firms than for other 
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funds. Since the family firm database covers only 2000 firms, I could not identify the 
ownership status for a portion of other stocks held by the funds (around 35% of the 
assets under management). Thus, I look at the fund holding returns based on three 
types of firms: family firms, non-family firms, and other firms (firms not covered by 
the family firm data, thus I do not know the ownership status for these firms).  
To obtain the fund holding return, I first calculate four-factor and five-factor 
alpha for each stock Using the dollars invested in each stock by a fund at the start of 
quarter as weights, I calculate the dollar value weighted fund alpha based on holdings. 
To obtain the stock alpha, I use factor loadings estimated using the previous 24 
monthly stock returns on a rolling basis. 
In panels A and B, I present the OLS results using fund return based on different 
types of stocks as dependent variables. I estimate the following panel regression: 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝐹𝐹𝐶4, 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑃5)𝑖,𝑞+1 
= 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝐹 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑞 
                       +𝛽2𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜃𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞 .    
  (3) 
where 𝛿𝑞 and 𝜃𝑓  are time-fixed effects and funds’ style-fixed effects, respectively. 
Fund control includes fund turnover, expense, total loads, log (fund TNA) and log 
(Fund family TNA). In panel B, the dependent variable is holding-based four-factor 
abnormal return.  In panel C, the dependent variable is holding-based five-factor 
abnormal return.  In columns (1) and (5), the fund holding alpha is based on all stocks 
in the fund portfolio. In columns (2) and (6), the fund holding alpha is based on all 
family firms. In columns (3) and (7), the fund holding alpha is based on all non-
family firms. In columns (4) and (8), the fund holding alpha is based on other stocks 
whose ownership status I was unable to identify. In panel A columns (1) and (5), I 
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find that funds overweighting family firms indeed earn profit on their existing 
positions. More specifically, I split the stocks held by a fund into three types: family 
firms, non-family firms, and firms whose ownership status (other stocks) I was unable 
to identify. I find that funds overweighting family firms earn profit from their 
positions in family firms and other stocks but not non-family firms. For example, 
funds in the top decile of holdings in family firms earn 0.062% (see column 6) higher 
four-factor alpha from their positions in family firms, but the return difference is not 
observed for positions in non-family firms; see column 6 ~ 8 in panel A. This 
suggests that certain funds have superior ability to identify valuable family firms and 
profit from their extensive investments in family firms. However, the ability to 
identify such profitable opportunity indicates that the fund managers are skilled in 
processing opaque information, and this skill enables them to also profit from some 
other positions.  
In panel B, I use holding return based on five-factor model, and I find similar 
evidence that funds overweighting family firms earn higher abnormal returns from 
their existing positions in family firms. The relation between fund returns based on 
held stocks and fund investment in family firm (in Table 3) is weaker than that in 
Table 2 (between fund abnormal returns and family firm holding). The reason is 
partially due to the interim trading during the interval of report periods documented 
by Puckeit and Yan (2011). They show that institutional investors earn significant 
abnormal returns on their trades within the trading quarter and any trading skills that 
use quarterly data are biased downwards because of their inability to account for 
interim trades. In this paper, since the funds’ holdings are reported quarterly, holding-
based fund returns calculated based on stocks held in the portfolio overlook the 
interim trades, thus underestimate their true profits. 
A.3. Stock-level Analysis: Trading Prior to Earnings Announcements 
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Moreover, I look at concentrated funds’ trading prior to earnings announcements 
to uncover how they generate abnormal returns. I use daily institutional trading data 
from Abel/Noser to better capture the exact timing of institutional trading. This 
database is widely used in prior studies to analyze the high-frequency trading by 
institutional investors, see for example, Chemmanur et al. (2010). Since the database 
does not provide information about portfolio holding, so I infer institutional holding 
from their cumulative net trading in the past three years, similar to Hu et al. (2014). 
Institutions are classified into two groups based on fraction of total holdings allocated 
to family firms stocks. If an institution’s holding of family firm rank in the top decile, 
then it is classified as concentrated fund; otherwise it is classified as other fund. There 
is caveat associated with this data: it includes equity trading by not only mutual funds, 
but also other institutional investors, such as hedge funds and pension funds. I do not 
differentiate exact types of institutions due to data limitation.  
Net buy refers to the total shares bought minus sold of each stock by institutions 
scaled by shares outstanding (in basis point). To mitigate the concern that there is 
market-wide trend to buy or sell around the announcement, I adjusted the Net buy for 
each stock by the trading by all institutions in all stocks in the same period. This 
adjusted Net buy is Mkt adjusted Net buy. For each stock, I aggregate the Net buy and 
total Mkt adjusted Net buy by concentrated fund and other funds separately. (∆ 
EPS)/P refers to the difference between earnings per share in quarter q and q-4, scaled 
by the stock price in the one month prior to earning announcement. CAR refers to 
three day cumulative abnormal returns (using market model) around earnings 
announcement. The rank of (∆ EPS)/P and CAR are conducted separately for each 
quarter. Each observation in the following table is one quarterly earnings 
announcement (on announcement day t). 
In Table 4, I find that concentrated funds’ trading in family firms during three 
days prior to earnings announcements is highly profitable, especially for trading 
before announcement of favorable earnings news. I group quarterly earnings 
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announcement based on earnings surprise and earnings announcement returns 
separately. I find that concentrated funds’ trading prior to the earnings announcement 
predicts the earnings surprise and earnings announcement returns well. In contrast, 
trading by other funds prior to earnings announcements does not have such predictive 
power. I also compare net trading in five days prior to earnings announcement and 
find similar results.  
As a comparison, I look at trading by both types of funds prior to earnings 
announcement of non-family firms. Neither of the two types of funds have predictive 
power for the future earnings news. 
A.4. Sub-Periods: Pre- and Post- SOX Act 
If funds overweighting family firms have information advantage about family 
firms, this advantage would be weakened after the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act. 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act, enacted in July 20, 2002, set new or enhanced standards for 
all U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting firms. After the 
passage of SOX, one would expect that as the quality of public information improves, 
informed managers can make less profit by trading based on their private information.  
In Table 5, I study the relation between fund investment in family firms and fund 
subsequent performance in pre- and post- Sarbanes–Oxley Act periods. I investigate 
the performance of funds pursuing the same strategy, i.e., top decile funds ranked in 
each quarter, in sub-periods. Since the sort of funds is independent in each quarter, if 
the top decile funds have better performance than other funds before SOX but not 
after SOX, it would indicate that the informativeness of the same strategy is 
weakened by the SOX. 
Panel A shows the abnormal returns for funds in ten decile groups sorted by 
level of holdings in family firms in each quarter in each Lipper style.  In the bottom 
three rows, I show the return differences between D10 versus D1, D10 versus the 
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Bottom five deciles, and D10 versus the Bottom nine deciles. The results show that 
D10 (top decile) funds outperform other funds in both periods, but the magnitude of 
return difference is much larger for the period before SOX (2001~2002) than the later 
period. For example, D10 funds outperform the remaining nine  deciles by 0.597*** 
in style-adjusted return per month in 2001~2002, while the return difference declines 
to 0.084** in 2003~2010. Similar results are observed for other return measures and 
comparison groups. 
Panel B shows the OLS results with an interaction between Pre-SOX period 
dummy and fund investment level in family firms using the full sample in 10 years. I 
estimate the following panel regression: 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗 𝑅𝑒𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝐶4, 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑃5)𝑖,𝑞+1
= 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑂𝑋
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑞
+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝐹 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑞
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜃𝑓
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑞,                                                        (4) 
where 𝛿𝑞 and 𝜃𝑓  are time-fixed effects and funds’ style-fixed effects, respectively. 
Fund control includes fund turnover, expense, total loads, log (fund TNA) and log 
(Fund family TNA). Dependent variables are monthly performance measures 
averaged in quarter q+1, in percentage. Pre-SOX is a dummy that equals one if it is in 
year 2001 or 2002, otherwise equals zero. Other independent variables are lagged by 
one quarter. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term between Pre-SOX and 
fund investment in family firms. I observe the coefficient of the interaction terms are 
significant in five out of six specifications in Table 6, suggesting that skilled 
managers indeed make more money through trading in family firms. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of Dummy (Concentrated Fund) is still significant, suggesting that skilled 
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managers are able to exploit and benefit from the private information about family 
firms even after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, though the passage of the Act makes their 
strategy less profitable. 
A.5. Fund Holdings in Family Firms with More Information Asymmetry 
The strategy to specialize in family firms would generate higher profit from 
family firms with higher asymmetric information.  This argument rests on the 
following reason: if the family firms are “greener pastures” for skilled fund managers 
due to their opaque nature, the relation between fund holdings in family firms and 
subsequent fund abnormal returns should be more profound when the family firms are 
more opaque.  
To test this, I first divide family firms into two groups: High Opacity group and 
Low Opacity group, based on each of the following firm-level proxies for precision of 
public signal: (1) Fraction of uncertain words in 10-K; (2) Number of business 
segments; (3) HHI index of sales in different business segments; (4) Amihud 
Illiquidity; (5) Trading volume; (6) Bid-ask spread. The selection of (1) Fraction of 
uncertain words in 10-K is motivated by the fact that if a firm uses more uncertain 
words in its annual report (e.g., in discussion of company outlook or explanation for 
past returns), the public information would be noisier while the informed investors 
may gain finer information by other channels, such as selective assess to management. 
The selection of (2) Number of business segments and (3) HHI index of sales in 
different business segments is motivated by the fact that the two measures are used to 
capture how complex a company is, see Cohen and Lou (2012), and the complexity of 
a firm may add noise to public knowledge about the firm’s true status while informed 
investors may gain better information by close and detailed analysis. The selection of 
the other three proxies, (4), (5), and (6) is motived by the fact that they reflect how 
heterogeneous the beliefs are that market participants have about the stock. If the 
22 
 
value of proxy is greater than the median (less than median for HHI index and trading 
volume) of all family firms in the same year, then the family firm is an opaque family 
firm; otherwise, it is a transparent family firm. I calculated the fraction of fund 
holding in the two groups of family firms separately, and adjust the value by the 
average of all funds in the same investment style. 
If the opacity of family firms is the driven factor of positive relation between 
holding in family firms and superior fund performance, one would expect that fund 
holdings in opaque family firms would play a more important role than fund holdings 
in less opaque family firms. In Table 6, I calculate the two fund holding variables 
separately based on each type of firm-level proxy of opacity. I only report results 
using three information asymmetry measures: Amihud Illiquidity, Fraction of 
uncertain words in 10-K, and Number of business segments for the brevity of 
presentation. In unreported tables, I find that using the rest three measures would have 
similar results. I find that Style adj FF holding (H Opa.) plays a major role in 
explaining the positive relation between holding in family firms and superior fund 
performance. The results validate that the opacity of family firms indeed provides a 
“greener pasture” for skilled managers. 
B. Funds’ Concentration in Family Firms and Other Investment Skills 
In this paper, the skill to invest in opaque family firms potentially correlates 
positively with other investment skills, particularly portfolio industry concentration 
coined by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). Both studies show evidence that 
skilled fund managers exhibit superior performance by holding more concentrated 
portfolios to exploit their information advantages while they differ in the 
measurement and interpretation of concentration. The difference is that Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2005) measure how much a mutual fund portfolio deviates from 
the market portfolio in investable equities within ten industries, i.e., place large active 
bets in certain industries. In this paper, I focus on the extent of active bets placed by 
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fund managers in family firms, a presumably opaque equity class. Funds in the top 
decile of holdings of family firms invest 43.5% of their assets in family firms, much 
higher than the average level of mutual fund industry (23.7%). Therefore, funds 
skilled in investing in family firms may also have higher industry concentration if the 
superior information about family firms comes from the funds’ expertise in certain 
specific industries. 
In Table 7 panel A, funds are classified into two groups based on their holdings 
in family firms, Concentrated  fund (in the top decile of holding in family firms) and 
other funds. I find that funds overweighting family firms have higher industry 
concentration value than other funds. This suggests the skill identified in this paper is 
consistent with existing findings about managerial skills. 
To study whether the skill in this paper carries additional information to fund 
industry concentration and other skill measures, in an unreported table, I regress 
subsequent fund abnormal return on funds’ holding in family firms as in a prior test 
and control for fund industry concentration in addition. As before, I find qualitatively 
similar results about the coefficient of the skill variable. To look at the interplay of 
the managerial skill identified in this paper with fund portfolio industry concentration, 
I double sort funds in each quarter into eight groups formed on the basis of extent of 
investment in family firms and fund portfolio industry concentration. Then I report a 
five-factor fund alpha for each fund group. I find that funds overweighting family 
firms outperform other funds when funds are in the top two quartiles of industry 
concentration measure.  
Another investment skill of concern is the return gap, see Kacperczyk, Sialm, 
and Zheng (2008). I find that funds overweighting family firms have slightly higher 
industry concentration than other funds. After sorting funds into quarter by return gap 
measures, I find the return difference between funds overweighting family firms and 
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other funds is positive in all return gap quarters while the difference is significant 
when the return gap is in the top two quarters. These results suggest that the skill 
manifested in their concentrated investment in family firms is related to and 
consistent with a large literature of fund managerial skills.  
In unreported tables, I control geographical distance-based skills (e.g., Coval et 
al. 2001) and education network-based skills (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008) in the 
multivariate fund performance regression. Specifically, for each fund, I calculate the 
average distance from fund manager to each stock in the fund portfolio. I also 
calculate the fraction of dollar fund asset that is invested in education-connected firms. 
If the fund manager graduated from the same institution with at least one of the firm 
board members, then this firm is regarded as an “Education-connected firms” for this 
fund. As the specification in Table 2 panel B (or equation 2), I use fund abnormal 
returns (style-adjusted and risk-adjusted) in the next quarter as dependent variable, 
and use the concentrated fund dummy as main explanatory variable. In addition, I 
control for the average fund-firm distance and fund fraction of connected holdings. I 
find that the coefficient for the concentrated fund dummy has similar results as Table 
2 panel B (significant and positive). This indicates the skills of funds that invest 
heavily in family firms are not fully captured by either the geography or social 
network based skills as documented in prior literature. 
C. Funds Organizational Structure and Decision of Holding Family Firms 
While the information hypothesis explains why some fund managers hold 
concentrated positions in family firms, the fact that some funds maintain low level 
holdings in family firms is not fully explained by informational reasons. We observe 
a convex relation between portfolio holdings in family firms and fund performance in 
Table 2 panel A. After fund holdings in family firms drop below the median within 
the same fund style, further decreases in the fund holdings in family firms are not 
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associated with worse fund performance. I posit that organizational structure of 
mutual funds play a role in explaining why some fund managers hold relative few 
family firms comparing to other funds with the same fund style. To test the 
determinants of investment decision-making, I estimate the following panel 
regression: 
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝐹 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑞+1 
= 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑞 
+𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 +  𝛿𝑞 +  𝜃𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞.      
  (5) 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑞 is a log of fund family total net asset (TNA). 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑞 is a 
dummy that equals one if the fund is managed by multiple fund managers, otherwise 
it equals zero. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑞 is a dummy that equals one if the fund has an 
institutional class, otherwise it equals zero. 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑞 is a dummy that equals one 
if the fund is affiliated with a commercial banking company, otherwise it equals zero. 
Fund control includes fund turnover, expense, total loads and log (fund TNA). 𝛿𝑞 and 
𝜃𝑓 are time fixed effects and funds style fixed effects, respectively.  
Table 8 panel A shows OLS results with Style adjusted FF holding as dependent 
variable.  I find that more cautious funds, i.e., funds affiliated with larger fund 
families, funds affiliated with a commercial lending conglomerate, funds offering an 
institutional class,
 4
 hold fewer family firm positions than other funds. Governance-
related concerns aside, the control right of funds seems also play a role in shaping 
funds’ holdings of family firms: team-managed funds hold fewer family firms than 
single-manager funds (e.g., Almazan et al., 2004; Dass et al., 2013). 
                                                          
4
 McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010) show that larger financial institutions are more 
sensitive to corporate governance and control issues;  Sias, and Starks (2003) report that a 
commercial lending conglomerate is more concerned about holding prudent securities. 
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Larger fund families are more sensitive to corporate governance and control 
issues when screening which firm to invest since they have to follow the “prudent 
man” rule. Funds affiliated with larger fund complexes are thus conservative to invest 
in family firms that usually have dual class structure and worse disclosure, both of 
which are negative signals for outsider investors.
5
 
Affiliation with banking companies that are usually subject to stringent operation 
requirement may expose the affiliated fund to higher prudent standard and refrain 
from holding firms with weak external governance, such as family firms. Meanwhile, 
fund managers affiliated with commercial banking companies may benefit from the 
information spillover from the bank’s sibling arm, since the funds may have access to 
company information obtained by the bank’s commercial lending arm. Thus those 
funds may be prone to invest in companies that are clients or potential clients of the 
bank’s commercial lending service.  Since family firms have lower leverage level 
compared with non-family firms, see e.g., Strebulaev and Yang (2013), Anderson, 
Reeb and Zhao (2012); thus, family firms are less likely to draw the attention of fund 
managers affiliated with a commercial bank. Funds affiliated with commercial 
banking companies refrain from investing heavily in family firms.  
Funds that have institutional class, compared with funds serving only retail 
investors, are more likely to be affected by the preference of institutional investors 
(aversion of firms with weaker governance), thus those funds are less likely to invest 
heavily in family firms. 
Team-managed funds have more investment restrictions than solo-manager 
funds, since team members have less of their reputation at stake than the manager of a 
solo-manager fund and optimal contract requires imposing more investment 
restrictions on team-managed funds; see Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman 
                                                          
5
 The reported tables measure the size of fund family by total asset under management, results 
are similar if using total number of funds under management instead 
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(2004). Thus team-managed funds are less likely to bypass all the restrictions and 
concentrate in one particular asset class, for example, family firms. Even if no explicit 
restriction is placed on holding family firms, it is relative harder for team-managed 
funds to concentrate in one particular equity class, as predicted by the diversification 
of opinions theory; see Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011). Moreover, a fund manager in 
a team-managed fund has fewer control rights (shared by multiple managers) over the 
fund investment decision than solo-manager funds; see Dass, Nanda, and Wang 
(2013), so team-managed funds are less likely to overweight a certain category, e.g., 
family firms.  
I find that funds with lower turnover are more likely to overweight family firms. 
This observation is consistent with the fact that the family firms typically are less 
liquid and funds with lower turnover are more likely to invest in less liquid securities. 
Funds with higher expenses are more likely to overweight family firms. Since family 
firms are normally more opaque, thus have more difficulty generating private 
information, the fund managers might need to be compensated with higher fees so 
they have incentives to obtain valuable information and invest in family firms. Funds 
with lower total loads are more likely to invest heavily in family firms, since investor 
redemption is less costly for those funds and fund managers have to achieve superior 
performance to retain investors, possibly by investing in opaque equity classes (e.g., 
family firms) after skilled information generation. Fund size is positively related to 
the level of holding in family firms in Table 2 panel A, suggesting that larger funds 
have more bargaining power against a smaller fund family about whether to pursue a 
specific strategy. However, the positive relation is not significant if I use a dummy 
(Concentrated) as a dependent variable in Table 8 panel B. The lack of significance 
indicates that larger funds may experience investment constraint so their investment is 
not too extreme.  
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Overall, this section documents a distortion effect of the prudent-man rule on 
mutual funds investment that receives little attention in the literature. Unlike other 
institutions governed by common law or the Employees Retirement Income Security 
Act (e.g., bank trusts and pension funds), mutual funds possess broader investment 
flexibility and lower prudence standard (Guercio (1996)). One potential effect of the 
prudent-man rule centers on the cross-institutional effect to economically linked 
mutual funds. Consistent with this conjecture, my analysis shows funds affiliated with 
banks or funds offering shares to institutional investors refrain from investing heavily 





Chapter 4 Conclusions 
This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, to my knowledge, this 
is the first work in literature that studies how financial intermediaries’ actual 
investment decision is affected by target stocks’ ownership using proprietary data of 
stock controlled by founding families. I provide evidence of sophisticated informed 
trading in family firms by concentrated mutual funds that specialized in investing 
family firms. More specifically, I find that concentrated funds earn sizeable profits by 
building long positions in family firms before firms release good news. My result 
confirms the theoretical argument by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kacperczyk 
and Seru (2007) that informed investors hold more good securities than uninformed 
investors. I conduct a variety of supplementary tests to show that the superior returns 
of concentrated funds come from investment skill rather by alternative explanations.  
These concentrated funds have higher stock selectivity, higher industry 
concentration, higher return gap, and closer geographical distance to stocks in its 
portfolio than other funds. However, the skill of these concentrated funds is not fully 
explained by any of existing skill indicators, suggesting that fund specialization in 
firm ownership represent a new skill of fund managers. This new skill is related to 
relatively unexplored unique features of information diffusion for family firms. For 
example, family firms may have a variety of linkages that could facilitate information 
leakage documented by Anderson et al. (2012).  
Second, I analyze how the organizational properties of the institutions affect 
their trade-off of pros and cons in investing firms with concentrated ownership 
structure. I provide compelling evidence that cautious funds (such as funds affiliated 
with larger fund families or commercial banking companies, or funds with an 
institutional class) hold less family firms in their portfolios, perhaps due to concerns 
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Figure 1 Institutions’ Net Buy Prior to Earnings Announcement (Group firm-
quarter by Earnings Surprise) 
I sort all firm-quarter observations by earnings surprise into four groups separately for 
each quarter (I obtain earnings surprise by taking the difference between earnings per 
share in quarter t and t-4, scaled by the stock price in the one month prior to earning 
announcement). I report institutions’ net buy (# of shares bought minus # of share 
sold, scaled by shares outstanding) in three days prior to the announcement date. I 
report the net buy by two types of institutions separately. Please refer to Table 4 for 
definition of Concentrated funds and Other funds. 
 
Figure 2 Institutions’ Net Buy Prior to Earnings Announcement (Group firm-
quarter by Earnings Announcement CAR)  
I sort all firm-quarter earnings by cumulative abnormal return around earnings 
announcement (CAR) into quartile groups, and report net buy by institutions in stocks 
in each quartile in three days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
FF holding is the fraction of holdings invested in family firms in each quarter 
for each fund.  Style-adjusted FF holding is the fraction of holdings invested 
in family firms adjusted by the average value of funds within the same Lipper 
investment style and within the same quarter. Concentrated equals one if the 
FF holding ranks in the top decile (largest) among funds in the same 
investment Lipper style, otherwise equals zero. Style-ad Ret is fund return 
adjusted by the average of the funds in the same Lipper investment style. 
FFC4 alpha and FFCP5 alpha are abnormal fund returns obtained using 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and five-factor model, which uses 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factors in addition to a liquidity factor by Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003). HLD_FF_FFC4 are fund-level weighted average of 
four factor stock alpha for all family firm stocks held by the fund (use the 
fund’s dollar holdings in each stock as weight). HLD_NF_FFC4 is defined 
similarly using non-family firm stocks held by each fund.  HLD_FF_FFCP5 
and HLD_NF_FFCP5 are calculated based on five factors (Carhart four 
factors plus liquidity factor) stock alpha. Factor loadings are estimated using 
the previous 24 monthly fund returns on a rolling basis. All return variables 
are monthly performance measures averaged in a quarter, in percentage. 
Expense is the fund expense ratio per annum. Turnover is the minimum of 
aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by the 
average TNA. Total load is the sum of front-end and rear-end load fees. Team-
Managed Fund Dummy is an indicator that equals one if the fund is managed 
by a team; it equals zero if the fund is managed by solo manager. Has 
Institutional-Class Dummy equals one if the fund has an institutional class, 
otherwise equals zero. Owned By Banks Dummy equals one if the fund is 
affiliated with a commercial bank, otherwise equals zero. Fund age gives the 
age of funds. For the funds with multiple classes, I take the age of the oldest 
share class. Size Score, Value Score, Mom Score, Beta Score and Illiquidity 
Score are average quintile ranks of size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, 
beta and Amihud illiquidity measure for portfolio stocks (1 for the lowest, and 
5 for the highest).  Log (Firm-Firm Distance) is the log of average distance 
from fund to all firms held by the fund. Fraction of Edu Connected holdings is 
the fraction of fund TNA invested in firms connected with the fund via 
common education background between fund manager and at least one of firm 




Panel A: Statistics of main variables 
  # of obs Mean Std. P10 Median P90 
FF holding  74,982 0.237 0.112 0.117 0.220 0.371 
Style-adj return 74,441 0.001 3.325 -3.289 -0.007 3.267 
FFC 4 factor alpha 72,553 -0.141 1.041 -1.311 -0.128 1.015 
FFCP 5 factor alpha 72,553 -0.129 1.084 -1.319 -0.123 1.064 
HLD_FF_FFC4 72,396 -0.003 2.424 -2.519 -0.043 2.607 
HLD_FF_FFCP5 72,396 -0.007 2.524 -2.591 -0.067 2.702 
HLD_NF_FFC4 72,326 -0.068 1.520 -1.699 -0.032 1.514 
HLD_NF_FFCP5 72,326 -0.004 1.569 -1.684 0.013 1.642 
Turnover 69,285 0.974 1.405 0.190 0.690 1.860 
Expenses 69,760 1.332 1.052 0.812 1.250 1.890 
Total load 72,859 0.019 0.021 0.000 0.010 0.051 
Log (Fund TNA) 72,760 5.234 2.057 2.625 5.272 7.834 
Log (Fund Family TNA) 72,804 8.104 2.566 4.583 8.409 10.929 
Team-Managed Dummy 74,982 0.615 0.487 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Institutional-Class Dummy 74,982 0.539 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Owned by Bank Dummy 74,982 0.124 0.330 0.000 0.000 1.000 
# of Stocks Held 74,982 120.96 186.84 34.00 75.00 223 




Panel B: Comparing funds overweighting family firms to other funds 
  Concentrated Funds Other Funds Difference in mean 
 
Mean Median Std.  Mean Median Std.  Conc.- Other p-value 
Panel A: General Fund Characteristics               
Fund TNA ($Mil) 1,406 151 5,056 1,322 198 5,451 84 0.2112 
Fund Family TNA ($Mil) 22,745 2,791 77,855 35,983 4,731 101,654 -13,238 <.0001 
Turnover 0.857 0.500 1.505 0.987 0.710 1.394 -0.130 <.0001 
Expenses 1.480 1.318 2.389 1.315 1.250 0.776 0.165 <.0001 
Total load 0.017 0.010 0.021 0.020 0.010 0.021 -0.002 <.0001 
Fund Age (Years) 13.227 8.000 14.676 12.837 9.000 13.519 0.390 0.0192 
Fund Mgr. Tenure (Years) 7.405 5.667 6.702 6.286 4.917 5.443 1.119 <.0001 
Prior One Year Return 0.216 0.599 2.015 0.190 0.596 1.894 0.026 0.2604 
Team-Managed Dummy 0.551 1.000 0.497 0.622 1.000 0.485 -0.071 <.0001 
Institutional-Class Dummy 0.396 0.000 0.489 0.555 1.000 0.497 -0.159 <.0001 
Affiliated with Commercial Banks 0.069 0.000 0.254 0.130 0.000 0.336 -0.061 <.0001 
Panel B: Fund Characteristics Based on Stocks Held 
      # of Stocks Held 66.886 51.000 99.255 126.927 78.000 193.167 -60.041 <.0001 
Size Score 4.149 4.548 0.966 4.380 4.740 0.747 -0.232 <.0001 
Value Score 2.429 2.347 0.637 2.380 2.354 0.565 0.049 <.0001 
Mom Score 3.159 3.134 0.513 3.182 3.176 0.500 -0.022 0.0004 
Beta Score 3.185 3.172 0.373 3.199 3.202 0.305 -0.014 0.0003 
Illiquidity Score 1.533 1.282 0.628 1.289 1.093 0.402 0.244 <.0001 
Log (Fund-Firm Distance) 7.417 7.412 0.313 7.436 7.406 0.280 -0.019 <.0001 





Panel C: Correlation 
  




Style adj. FF holding 1   
Concentrated Fund Dummy 0.669*** 1 
Style-adj return 0.017*** 0.018*** 
FFC 4 factor alpha 0.018*** 0.016*** 
FFCP 5 factor alpha 0.016*** 0.015*** 
HLD_FF_FFC4 0.009** 0.006 
HLD_FF_FFCP5 0.007* 0.007* 
HLD_NF_FFC4 -0.002 0.003 
HLD_NF_FFCP5 -0.002 0.003 
Turnover -0.032*** -0.027*** 
Expenses 0.028*** 0.047*** 
Total load -0.055*** -0.034*** 
Log (Fund TNA) 0.002 -0.028*** 
Log (Fund Family TNA) -0.056*** -0.087*** 
Team-Managed Fund Dummy -0.037*** -0.044*** 
Has Institutional-Class Dummy -0.094*** -0.096*** 
Owned by Bank Dummy -0.048*** -0.055*** 
Log (# of Stocks Held) -0.083*** -0.199*** 





Table 2: Fund Holdings in Family Firms and Abnormal Performance 
This table shows whether funds that overweight family firms have better 
subsequent abnormal returns. In panel A, I sort all the funds within each 
mutual fund style (Lipper investment styles) into deciles in each quarter based 
on the fraction of investment in family firms, FF holding.  
 
Panel B shows the multivariate test. Dependent variables are monthly 
performance measures averaged in a quarter, in percentage. Style-adjusted FF 
holding is the fraction of holdings invested in family firms adjusted by the 
average value of funds within the same Lipper investment style and within the 
same quarter. Concentrated equals one if the FF holding ranks in the top 
decile (largest) among funds in the same investment Lipper style, otherwise 
equals zero.  Style-ad Ret is fund return adjusted by the average of the funds in 
the same Lipper investment style. FFC4 alpha and FFCP5 alpha are abnormal 
returns obtained using Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and five-factor 
model which uses Fama-French-Carhart four-factors in addition to a liquidity 
factor by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Factor loadings are estimated using 
the previous 24 monthly fund returns on a rolling basis. I exclude index funds. 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics using robust standard errors 
clustered at the fund level.  Statistical significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% 
level (***) is indicated. 
 
Panel A: Sort funds based on FF holding within each Lipper style and within each 
quarter 
  FF holding Style-adj return FFC4 alpha FFCP5 alpha 
D1 (Bottom) 0.102 -0.061 -0.164 -0.148 
D2 0.155 -0.046 -0.153 -0.136 
D3 0.181 -0.012 -0.151 -0.134 
D4 0.200 -0.005 -0.147 -0.132 
D5 0.217 0.020 -0.128 -0.116 
D6 0.235 -0.014 -0.152 -0.143 
D7 0.252 -0.052 -0.151 -0.139 
D8 0.277 -0.007 -0.143 -0.130 
D9 0.317 0.015 -0.130 -0.125 
D10 (Concentrated) 0.435 0.177 -0.091 -0.080 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Style adj FF holding 0.649*** 0.214*** 0.201*** 
   
 
(3.39) (3.86) (3.51) 
   Concentrated 
   
0.232*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 
    
(4.15) (4.12) (3.74) 
Turnover -0.029 -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.028 -0.032*** -0.037*** 
 
(-1.15) (-5.65) (-5.90) (-1.12) (-5.64) (-5.88) 
Expenses -0.328*** -0.102*** -0.097*** -0.331*** -0.102*** -0.098*** 
 
(-4.93) (-6.70) (-6.49) (-5.00) (-6.74) (-6.52) 
Total load -0.640 0.068 -0.003 -0.704 0.038 -0.030 
 
(-0.80) (0.29) (-0.01) (-0.89) (0.16) (-0.13) 
Log (Fund TNA) -0.039*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.038*** -0.016*** -0.014*** 
 
(-4.13) (-5.44) (-4.89) (-4.14) (-5.41) (-4.86) 
Log (FundFam TNA) 0.028*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.028*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(3.50) (3.42) (3.07) (3.62) (3.48) (3.13) 
Constant 0.556*** 0.543*** 0.560*** 0.530*** 0.535*** 0.552*** 
 
(3.67) (11.65) (11.29) (3.52) (11.51) (11.17) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,272 71,447 71,447 72,272 71,447 71,447 






Table 3: Abnormal Return Based on Fund Holdings 
 
This table shows whether funds that overweight family firms have the ability 
to earn higher abnormal return in their positions in family firms, non-family 
firms and other stocks (stocks that are not covered by the family firm data, 
thus I do not know the ownership status for those stocks).  
 
Dependent variables in panels A and B are monthly performance measures 
averaged in a quarter, in percentage. I calculate four-factor and five-factor 
alpha for each stock, then use the dollars invested in each stock by a fund at 
the start of quarter as weight, I calculate the fund alpha based on holdings. To 
get stock alpha, I use factor loadings estimated using the previous 24 monthly 
stocks returns on a rolling basis. In columns (1) and (5) of panels B and C, the 
fund holding alpha is based on all stocks held in the fund portfolio. In columns 
(2) and (6), the fund holding alpha is based on all family firms held by the 
fund. In columns (3) and (7), the fund holding alpha is based on all non-family 
firms held by the fund. In columns (4) and (8), the fund holding alpha is based 
on other stocks in the fund portfolio whose ownership status I was unable to 
identify. Style-adjusted FF holding is the fraction of holdings invested in 
family firms adjusted by the average value of funds within the same Lipper 
investment style and within the same quarter. Concentrated equals one if the 
FF holding ranks in the top decile (largest) among funds in the same 
investment Lipper style, otherwise equals zero. Please refer to Table 2 for 
definition of other variables. I exclude index funds. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the fund 





Panel A: OLS regression with four-factor alpha based on holdings as dependent variable 










Stocks  Others 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Style adj FF holding 0.127* 0.271** -0.001 0.239** 
    
 
(1.79) (2.24) (-0.01) (2.40) 
    Concentrated  
    
0.053*** 0.061** 0.020 0.057* 
     
(2.73) (2.06) (0.64) (1.85) 
Turnover -0.007 -0.019** -0.024*** 0.023*** -0.007 -0.019** -0.024*** 0.023*** 
 
(-1.58) (-2.05) (-3.81) (2.71) (-1.53) (-2.07) (-3.75) (2.68) 
Expenses -0.036*** -0.067** -0.025 -0.034 -0.037*** -0.065** -0.026 -0.032 
 
(-2.71) (-2.18) (-1.47) (-1.49) (-2.79) (-2.12) (-1.55) (-1.42) 
Total load 0.597** 1.726*** 0.800*** -0.178 0.591** 1.669*** 0.817*** -0.226 
 
(2.57) (3.45) (2.93) (-0.47) (2.56) (3.33) (3.00) (-0.59) 
Log (Fund TNA) -0.005* 0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005* 0.003 -0.006* -0.002 
 
(-1.71) (0.44) (-1.64) (-0.54) (-1.73) (0.52) (-1.70) (-0.46) 
Log (Fund Family TNA) -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008* -0.003 -0.004 
 
(-1.59) (-1.62) (-1.20) (-0.93) (-1.49) (-1.66) (-1.12) (-0.97) 
Constant 0.707*** 1.445*** 0.497*** 0.404*** 0.702*** 1.437*** 0.496*** 0.397*** 
 
(15.50) (14.43) (8.03) (5.14) (15.45) (14.31) (8.09) (5.05) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,979 70,145 70,075 70,135 71,979 70,145 70,075 70,135 
R-squared 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 
 
Panel B: OLS regression with five-factor alpha based on holdings as dependent variable 
Dependent variable= Five factor alpha based on fund holdings 
 
All stocks Family Non-Family  Others All stocks Family Non-Family  Others 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Style adj. FF holding 0.077 0.221* -0.008 0.227** 
    
 
(1.01) (1.77) (-0.07) (2.11) 
    Concentrated 
    
0.043** 0.063** 0.017 0.059* 
     
(2.08) (2.04) (0.53) (1.81) 
Other fund controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,979 70,145 70,075 70,135 71,979 70,145 70,075 70,135 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 
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Table 4:  Net trading by Institutions Prior to Earnings Announcement 
 
Institutions are classified into two groups based on fraction of total holdings 
allocated to family firms stocks. Since the daily institutional trading database 
does not provide holding information, so I inferred institutional holding from 
their net trading in the past three years, similar to Hu et al. (2014). If an 
institution’s holding of family firm rank in top decile, then it is classified as 
concentrated fund; otherwise it is classified as other fund. 
 
Net buy refers to the total shares bought minus sold of each stock by 
institutions scaled by shares outstanding (in basis point). To mitigate the 
concern that there is market-wide trend to buy or sell around the 
announcement, I adjusted the Net buy for each stock by the trading by all 
institutions in all stocks in the same period. This adjusted Net buy is Mkt 
adjusted Net buy. For each stock, I aggregate the Net buy and total Mkt 
adjusted Net buy by concentrated fund and other funds separately.  
 
(∆ EPS)/P refers to the difference between earnings per share in quarter q and 
q-4, scaled by the stock price in the one month prior to earning announcement. 
CAR refers to three day cumulative abnormal returns (using market model) 
around earnings announcement. The rank of (∆ EPS)/P and CAR are 
conducted separately for each quarter. Each observation in the following table 





Panel A: Trading in Family firms (Stocks are ranked based on earning surprise)  
      Net buy in [t-3, t-1] 
Mkt adjusted  













1 (LOW) 3,424 -0.082 -0.107 -1.642 0.116 -1.419 
2 3,599 -0.002 -0.208 -0.433 -0.037 -0.263 
3 3,470 0.004 -0.247 -1.237 0.056 -0.934 
4 (HIGH) 3,391 0.067 0.127 -1.352 0.322 -1.158 
(4) - (1, 2, 3)   0.094*** 0.315** -0.254 0.277* -0.292 
 
Panel B: Trading in Family firms (Stocks are ranked based on CAR) 
      Net buy in [t-3, t-1] 
Mkt adjusted  













1 (LOW) 3,424 -8.306 -0.296 -1.564 -0.060 -1.328 
2 3,599 -1.505 -0.193 -0.792 -0.045 -0.643 
3 3,470 2.240 -0.077 -0.592 0.148 -0.367 
4 (HIGH) 3,391 9.702 0.129 -1.724 0.413 -1.440 
(4) - (1, 2, 3)   12.187*** 0.318** -0.746 0.399*** -0.664 
 
Panel C: Trading in Non-Family firms (Stocks are ranked based on earning 
surprise)  
      Net buy in [t-3, t-1] 
Mkt adjusted  
Net buy in [t-3, t-1] 
Rank of  
(∆ EPS)/P 
# of 









1 (LOW) 6,195 -0.077 -0.010 -0.831 0.197 -0.624 
2 6,027 -0.002 -0.143 -2.685 0.087 -2.455 
3 6,187 0.004 -0.061 -1.734 0.144 -1.529 
4 (HIGH) 6,221 0.061 -0.073 -2.095 0.152 -1.870 
(4) - (1, 2, 3)   0.086*** -0.001 -0.348 0.009 -0.338 
 
Panel D: Trading in Non-Family firms (Stocks are ranked based on CAR) 
      Net buy in [t-3, t-1] 
Mkt adjusted  













1 (LOW) 6,195 -8.439 -0.059 -1.863 0.166 -1.639 
2 6,027 -1.585 -0.118 -2.118 0.052 -1.948 
3 6,187 2.298 -0.134 -1.666 0.076 -1.457 
4 (HIGH) 6,221 9.532 0.023 -1.700 0.286 -1.438 




Table 5: Performance of Concentrated Funds in Pre-SOX Periods 
 
This table shows the relation between fund investments in family firms and 
fund performance in different periods, either before or after the passage of 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act that was enacted in July 20, 2002. Panel A shows the 
abnormal returns for funds in ten decile groups sorted by level of holdings in 
family firms in each quarter in each Lipper style.  
 
Panel B shows the OLS results with an interaction between Pre-SOX period 
dummy and fund investment level in family firms using the full sample in 10 
years. Dependent variables are monthly performance measures averaged 
quarter q+1, in percentage. Pre-SOX is a dummy that equals one if it is in year 
2001 or 2002, otherwise equals zero. Style-adjusted FF holding is the fraction 
of holdings invested in family firms adjusted by the average value of funds 
within the same Lipper investment style and within the same quarter. 
Concentrated equals one if the FF holding ranks in the top decile (largest) 
among funds in the same investment Lipper style, otherwise equals zero. Other 
independent variables are lagged by one quarter. I exclude index funds. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at 
the fund level.  Statistical significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level 




Panel A: Fund performance by ranking of FF holding in sub-periods 
  2001 ~ 2002 (Pre) 2003 ~ 2010 (Post) Difference (Pre -Post) 
  # of obs. 
Style-adj 
return FFC4 FFCP5 # of obs. 
Style-adj 
return FFC4 FFCP5 
Style-adj 
return FFC4 FFCP5 
D1(Bottom) 1,610 -0.137 -0.202 -0.139 5,912 -0.043 -0.154 -0.150 -0.094 -0.048 0.010 
D2 1,678 -0.254 -0.245 -0.198 6,111 0.017 -0.128 -0.119 -0.271*** -0.116*** -0.079*** 
D3 1,668 -0.164 -0.196 -0.140 6,037 0.031 -0.138 -0.132 -0.194** -0.058** -0.008 
D4 1,627 -0.067 -0.206 -0.149 5,842 0.012 -0.131 -0.127 -0.079 -0.074*** -0.022 
D5 1,564 -0.169 -0.174 -0.131 5,553 0.074 -0.115 -0.113 -0.232** -0.059** -0.017 
D6 1,614 -0.123 -0.147 -0.102 5,756 0.013 -0.154 -0.155 -0.137 0.007 0.053** 
D7 1,542 -0.116 -0.157 -0.125 5,814 -0.033 -0.149 -0.143 -0.083 -0.007 0.018 
D8 1,580 0.271 -0.106 -0.059 5,960 -0.081 -0.153 -0.148 0.353*** 0.047 0.089*** 
D9 1,612 0.020 -0.163 -0.133 6,058 0.014 -0.121 -0.123 0.006 -0.042 -0.010 
D10 (Concentrated) 1,571 0.513 -0.040 -0.011 5,873 0.085 -0.105 -0.099 0.428*** 0.065* 0.087** 
D10 - D1 
 
0.651*** 0.162*** 0.128**   0.128* 0.049** 0.051** 0.523*** 0.113* 0.077 
D10 - Bottom 5 deciles 0.672*** 0.165*** 0.140***   0.067 0.029** 0.029** 0.605*** 0.137*** 0.111** 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-SOX 1.792*** 0.427*** 0.380** 
   *Style Adj. FF hld. (3.92) (2.84) (2.39) 
   Style Adj. FF hld. 0.264 0.123** 0.120** 
   
 
(1.35) (2.23) (2.16) 
   Pre-SOX  
   
0.515*** 0.121** 0.097* 
*Concentrated 
   
(3.15) (2.50) (1.87) 
Concentrated 
   
0.125** 0.043*** 0.044*** 
    
(2.27) (2.60) (2.65) 
Turnover -0.029 -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.029 -0.033*** -0.037*** 
 
(-1.16) (-5.68) (-5.92) (-1.14) (-5.67) (-5.90) 
Expenses -0.332*** -0.103*** -0.098*** -0.334*** -0.103*** -0.098*** 
 
(-5.00) (-6.78) (-6.56) (-5.06) (-6.81) (-6.58) 
Total load -0.613 0.074 0.003 -0.629 0.056 -0.016 
 
(-0.77) (0.32) (0.01) (-0.79) (0.24) (-0.07) 
Log (Fund TNA) -0.038*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.038*** -0.016*** -0.014*** 
 
(-4.06) (-5.40) (-4.85) (-4.08) (-5.37) (-4.83) 
Log (Fund Fam. TNA) 0.027*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.028*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(3.49) (3.42) (3.07) (3.63) (3.49) (3.14) 
Constant 0.559*** 0.544*** 0.560*** 0.490*** 0.526*** 0.545*** 
 
(3.72) (11.68) (11.31) (3.25) (11.35) (11.04) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,272 71,447 71,447 72,272 71,447 71,447 





Table 6: Fund Holdings in Opaque versus Transparent Family Firms 
This table decomposes style-adjusted fund holding in family firms into two parts: Style adj. FF holding (High Opacity) and Style 
adj. FF holding (Low Opacity). I first sort family firms into High Opacity and Low Opacity groups based on six firm-level 
proxies for precision of public signal: (1) Amihud Illiquidity; (2) Fraction of uncertain words in 10-K; (3) Number of business 
segments; If the value of proxy is greater than the median of all family firms in the same year, then the family firm is an High 
opacity family firm; otherwise, it is a Low Opacity family firm. I calculated the fraction of fund holding in the two groups of 
family firms separately, and adjust the value by average of all funds in the same investment style. I exclude index funds. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the fund level.  Statistical significance on a 10% 




















Opacity measure =   Amihud Illiquidity Uncertain words in 10K Number of Business Segment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Style adj FF holding (H Opacity) 1.794*** 0.381*** 0.400*** 0.682** 0.299*** 0.270*** 0.967*** 0.230*** 0.203*** 
 
(5.64) (4.04) (4.31) (2.33) (3.61) (2.94) (3.71) (3.16) (2.62) 
Style adj FF holding (L Opacity) 0.062 0.129** 0.099 0.623*** 0.145** 0.144** 0.371 0.201** 0.199** 
 
(0.27) (2.02) (1.48) (2.63) (2.09) (2.04) (1.34) (2.40) (2.39) 
Other fund controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,272 71,447 71,447 72,272 71,447 71,447 72,272 71,447 71,447 





Table 7: Relation with Existing Indicators of Fund Investment Skills 
This table presents the relation between other fund investment skills and funds’ 
skills in investing in family firms (panel A). Panel B presents the five-factor 
alpha of eight portfolios formed on the basis of overweighting in family firms 
and other existing fund performance predictors. Concentrated equals one if 
funds rank in top decile within each investment style; otherwise equal zero 
(Refer to Table 2 for the details of sorting). In panel B, I sort funds 
independently into four groups based on Industry Concentration (Panel B1) 
and Return Gap (Panel B2).  
Panel A: Existing performance predictors for funds overweighting family firms and 
other funds 





Mean Median Std.  Mean Median Std.  Diff. p-value 
Industry Concentration 0.086 0.061 0.091 0.053 0.039 0.059 0.033 <.0001 
Return Gap (%) 0.045 0.061 1.194 0.023 0.042 0.878 0.022 0.0703 
 
Panel B: Five-factor fund alpha for eight fund groups 
Panel B1: Industry Concentration (IC)         
  High IC 3 2 Low  IC High IC - Low IC 
Concentrated (D10) -0.057 -0.042 -0.126 -0.175 0.118* 
Other Funds (D1~D9) -0.130 -0.134 -0.138 -0.139 0.008 
Concentrated - Other Funds 0.073** 0.092*** 0.012 -0.036 0.109** 
      Panel B2: Return Gap 
(RG) 
     
  High RG 3 2 Low RG 
High RG - Low 
RG 
Concentrated (D10) -0.028 -0.097 -0.107 -0.087 0.059 
Other Funds (D1~D9) -0.155 -0.145 -0.133 -0.104 -0.050*** 





Table 8: Funds’ Organizational Structure and Fund Holdings in Family Firms  
 
This table presents the relation between fund characteristic and fund 
investment in family firms. The dependent variable in panel A are continuous 
variables (Style adjusted FF holding or FF holding) and the dependent variable 
in panel B is a dummy, Dummy(Concentrated) equals one if the FF holding 
rank in the top decile (largest) among funds in the same investment Lipper 
style in the same quarter, otherwise equals zero.  Refer to Table 2 for 
definition of other variables. I exclude index funds. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the fund 
level.  Statistical significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is 
indicated. 
 
Panel A: OLS regression with Style adjusted FF holding as dependent variables 
Dependent= Style adj FF holding 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log (Fund Family TNA) -0.003*** 
























Owned By Bank Dummy 
   
-0.014*** -0.009*** 
    
(-4.57) (-3.08) 
Log (Fund TNA) 0.004*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.004*** 
 
(3.57) (2.00) (2.86) (2.05) (3.58) 
Turnover -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 
(-4.63) (-5.05) (-4.91) (-4.88) (-4.89) 
Expenses 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
 
(4.57) (5.23) (4.61) (5.12) (3.99) 
Total load -0.408*** -0.458*** -0.397*** -0.467*** -0.362*** 
 
(-5.28) (-5.89) (-5.27) (-5.99) (-4.79) 
Constant -0.015 -0.023** -0.021* -0.026** -0.008 
 
(-1.25) (-2.02) (-1.81) (-2.24) (-0.63) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,623 72,623 72,623 72,623 72,623 






Panel B: Probit regression with Dummy(Concentrated) as dependent variables 
(Coefficients are marginal effects) 
Dependent= Dummy (Concentrated Fund) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log (Fund Family TNA) -0.011*** 
























Owned By Bank Dummy 
   
-0.049*** -0.038*** 
    
(-4.73) (-3.53) 
Log (Fund TNA) 0.010*** 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.009*** 
 
(3.46) (0.56) (1.54) (0.66) (3.38) 
Turnover -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** 
 
(-3.98) (-4.28) (-4.18) (-4.12) (-4.28) 
Expenses 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.047*** 
 
(6.07) (7.32) (6.57) (7.14) (5.41) 
Total load -0.763*** -0.987*** -0.792*** -1.015*** -0.637*** 
 
(-3.60) (-4.70) (-3.93) (-4.81) (-3.19) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,563 72,563 72,563 72,563 72,563 







Figure A1. Top ten family firms most widely held by concentrated funds  
This figure depicts the number of concentrated funds holding each family firm 






Appendix A:  A Discussion about the Relation of Family Firm-Concentration 
with Two Existing Fund Skill Indicators: Reliance on Public Information, and 
Industry Concentration 
My approach to identify skilled fund managerial in this paper builds on several 
earlier works on fund manager performance.
6
 This paper closely connects to 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), who also study fund managerial skill, and with 
whom my paper shares the basic theme that skilled managers create value by holding 
concentrated holdings where they have informational advantage. The key distinction, 
however, lies in that I primarily focus on private information that skilled managers 
get fed about opaque family firms, whereas Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) 
focus on the informational advantage in a few industries.
7
 The general theme, 
originally suggested by Dybvig and Ross (1985), shows that fund managers’ skills 
can be identified by conditioning on information sets. Several later studies illustrate 
this idea by specifying various information sets, see e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1989), 
Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005) and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). In the 
specific context analyzed here, I study the set of private information about family 
firms. 
This paper can be also seen as complementary to Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). 
Kacperczyk and Seru begin with the assumption that information in the public 
domain is captured by analysts’ past recommendations, then go on to explore the 
implication of funds trading on change in public signal. They find that responsiveness 
                                                          
6
 See e.g., Daniel et al. (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng (2008), Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011), Randolph, Coval and Pastor (2005), Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009), Jiang and Sun (2013), Da, Gao, and Jagannathan(2010), Wermers, Yao 
and Zhao (2012). 
7
 Entrepreneurial funds have higher industry concentration, as confirmed in later tests, 
suggesting that the superior information about family firms partially comes from funds’ 
expertise in certain specific industries. However, the skill in this paper conveys additional 
information about managerial ability to fund industry concentration measure, in an unreported 
table, I regress subsequent fund abnormal return on entrepreneurial funds dummy controlling 




of a fund manager’s portfolio allocations to changes in public information decreases 
with the manager’s skill. More generally, their paper delivers a central message that 
skilled funds would rely less on public information, whereas they remain silent on the 
role of quality of public information. 
In contrast, this paper focuses on the question of how skilled funds would rely on 
private information as public information gets noisier. I explicitly model the role of 
quality of public information in shaping the informational advantage of skilled funds.
8
 
By demonstrating that concentrated funds achieve higher abnormal returns, this 
analysis suggests that skilled fund managers exploit the opacity of family firms by 
holding large positions in those firms precisely when these funds have positive 




                                                          
8
 Kacperczyk and Seru do not consider quality of public information since their argument is 
built on the notion that under informationally efficient markets, reliance on any information in 
the public domain should not generate abnormal returns. 
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Appendix B: A Toy Model and Empirical Predications on Skilled Fund Trading 
In this section, I sketch a simple model to illustrate discussion in the introduction 
regarding how the informed mutual funds shift their holdings in risky assets relative 
to uninformed investors. This model builds on Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and 
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). Different from those two studies, I consider how the 
degree of noise in public information affects informed investor trading based on 
private information about stocks. A central premise of this analysis is that family 
firms are associated with noisier public information than other firms.
9
 
B-1: Basic Model 
I consider a standard Crossman and Stiglitz (1980) economy, which is applied in 
mutual fund literature by Kacperczyk and Seru (2007).
10
 
The opportunity set for investors includes risk-free assets and one risky asset 
whose future value ?̂?, is normally distributed with mean ?̅? and precision 𝜌0. The per 
capita stock of the risky asset, t, is independently normally distributed with mean 𝑡̅ 
and precision 𝜂. Investors in this economy receive different signals today about the 
future value of the risky asset. Informed investors receive a private signal  𝑠1 , in 
addition to a public signal 𝑠2. Uninformed investors only receive a public signal 𝑠2.  
These signals follow normal distribution with a common mean but different precision, 
𝜌1  and 𝜌2 . Let 𝜇  be the fraction of investors in the economy who receive private 
signals about the asset. There are N investors, each having CARA utility with a 
coefficient of risk aversion of 𝜆>0. 
                                                          
9
 Anderson et al. (2009) show greater opacity in family firms relative to non-family firms.  I 
verified this argument in my sample, pleaser refer to Table A4 in the appendix. 
10
 Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) derives the same equation regarding the difference of holdings 




< 0 , to argue that if a fund relies more on public information (analyst 
recommendation), the less skilled the fund manager is. Please refer to Kacperczyk and Seru 
(2007) for the necessary steps to get Eq. (2). 
56 
 
Consider the optimization problem of investor n; they chooses the number of 




𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑤?̂?],        (1) 
where  𝑤?̂? = 𝑚?̂? + (?̂? − 𝑝) ∗  𝛼𝑛  is the end of period wealth. Informed and 
uninformed investors have differing expectations. Let us now analyze the properties 
of the demand functions of the informed and uninformed investors with respect to 
private information and the precision of public information. I analyze the difference 
between the per capita holdings of informed and uninformed investors. This 
difference is given by: 






,    (2) 
where 𝑝 is the price in this Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE),  𝑝 = 𝑎 ∗ ?̅? +































To analyze how private information affects portfolios of the informed and the 
uninformed, consider the impact of change in the private information, 𝑠1 , on the 






> 0.           (3) 






> 0.           (4) 
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(3) relies on an assumption that 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 𝜌. The arrival of good private information 
boosts the holdings of the risky asset by informed investors relative to those of the 
uninformed investors.  The implication of (4) is that holdings of informed investors 
are more responsive to private information when investors have noisier public 
information. The intuition for this result is straightforward: for firms with noisier 
public information (i.e., larger  𝜌2  ) such as family firms, the informed investors 
should buy (sell) more if their private signal 𝑠1  increases (decreases). A skilled 
manager is able to obtain and trade based on private information, either buying upon 
receiving positive private information or short selling upon receiving negative private 
information. Since few mutual funds are allowed to engage in short selling, they may 
just walk away upon receiving negative private information if they do not have 
existing positions. Empirically, it is more likely to observe the purchases of family 
firms by the skilled managers when they have private and good signals concerning 
those family firms. 
B-2: Empirical predications 
HN: High skill managers overweigh family firms in their portfolios compared to other 
funds in the same investment style. 




Table A1: Trends of Mutual Funds Holdings 
 
This table decomposes equity holdings positions for each fund as the quarter end, i.e., 
in months 3, 6, 9, and 12. The portfolio stock holding information is taken from the 
most recent reports prior to the quarter end. TOT/AUM is the fraction of dollar 
holdings in the stocks covered by family firm database to asset under management by 
the fund (sum of all dollar holdings in the fund portfolio). FF/TOT (NF/TOT) is the 
fraction of dollar holdings in family firms (non-family firms) to the dollar holdings in 
stocks covered by family firm database. FF/TOT is referred to as FF holding in later 
parts of this paper. FF/AUM (NF/AUM) is the fraction of dollar holdings in family 
firms (non-family firms) to asset under management by the fund. Index funds are 
excluded. 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted fund-quarter observations 
Year # of Obs. TOT/AUM FF/TOT NF/TOT FF/AUM NF/AUM 
2001 7,854 0.665 0.250 0.750 0.165 0.500 
2002 8,212 0.679 0.263 0.737 0.178 0.500 
2003 8,280 0.668 0.272 0.728 0.182 0.486 
2004 8,300 0.652 0.254 0.746 0.165 0.488 
2005 8,174 0.637 0.245 0.755 0.155 0.482 
2006 7,779 0.599 0.225 0.775 0.133 0.465 
2007 7,573 0.581 0.215 0.785 0.122 0.458 
2008 7,332 0.589 0.208 0.792 0.118 0.471 
2009 6,222 0.590 0.211 0.789 0.121 0.469 
2010 5,256 0.583 0.205 0.795 0.116 0.467 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted fund-quarter observations (Use fund Total Net Asset as 
weight)  
Year # of Obs. TOT/AUM FF/TOT NF/TOT FF/AUM NF/AUM 
2001 7,854 0.665 0.219 0.781 0.147 0.517 
2002 8,212 0.669 0.232 0.768 0.158 0.511 
2003 8,280 0.661 0.247 0.753 0.166 0.496 
2004 8,300 0.652 0.231 0.769 0.153 0.498 
2005 8,174 0.637 0.227 0.773 0.153 0.489 
2006 7,779 0.604 0.221 0.779 0.134 0.469 
2007 7,573 0.595 0.213 0.787 0.127 0.468 
2008 7,332 0.614 0.213 0.787 0.130 0.483 
2009 6,222 0.618 0.215 0.785 0.133 0.485 





Panel C: Fraction of fund holding invested in family firms (FF holding) by year  
Year # of obs. Mean Std. P10 Median P90 
2001 7,854 0.249 0.122 0.123 0.226 0.400 
2002 8,212 0.262 0.116 0.135 0.245 0.399 
2003 8,280 0.271 0.110 0.148 0.260 0.395 
2004 8,300 0.252 0.110 0.128 0.244 0.376 
2005 8,174 0.246 0.112 0.124 0.233 0.373 
2006 7,779 0.225 0.108 0.113 0.209 0.350 
2007 7,573 0.215 0.108 0.106 0.198 0.341 
2008 7,332 0.207 0.109 0.096 0.188 0.334 
2009 6,222 0.210 0.099 0.110 0.194 0.329 
2010 5,256 0.206 0.098 0.112 0.194 0.313 
Total 74,982 0.237 0.112 0.117 0.220 0.371 
 
Panel D: Fraction of fund holding invested in family firms by fund investment style 
Fund Style # of obs. Mean Std. P10 Median P90 
Balanced Funds 3,138 0.213 0.084 0.124 0.207 0.301 
Equity Income Funds 2,606 0.162 0.090 0.069 0.148 0.264 
Extended US Large-Cap Core 61 0.190 0.062 0.122 0.170 0.277 
Equity Market Neutral 174 0.208 0.055 0.147 0.207 0.275 
Income Funds 443 0.158 0.095 0.032 0.161 0.267 
Large-Cap Core Funds 9,184 0.206 0.072 0.125 0.204 0.287 
Large-Cap Growth Funds 7,732 0.237 0.094 0.140 0.225 0.343 
Large-Cap Value Funds 4,478 0.161 0.080 0.078 0.152 0.246 
Long/Short Equity Funds 293 0.208 0.097 0.097 0.190 0.324 
Mid-Cap Core Funds 3,526 0.243 0.100 0.136 0.232 0.354 
Mid-Cap Growth Funds 5,673 0.247 0.110 0.123 0.236 0.380 
Mid-Cap Value Funds 2,892 0.226 0.112 0.108 0.210 0.360 
Multi-Cap Core Funds 6,190 0.242 0.124 0.128 0.217 0.370 
Multi-Cap Growth Funds 5,148 0.256 0.113 0.137 0.244 0.393 
Multi-Cap Value Funds 5,421 0.198 0.121 0.079 0.177 0.345 
Mixed-Asset Tar Allo Growth  1,829 0.188 0.086 0.104 0.176 0.286 
Small-Cap Core Funds 6,362 0.306 0.113 0.179 0.296 0.434 
Small-Cap Growth Funds 6,160 0.289 0.114 0.156 0.280 0.429 
Small-Cap Value Funds 3,672 0.316 0.126 0.178 0.302 0.469 





Table A2: Relation between Performance and Holding in Family Firms for 
Index Funds 
 
This table shows whether funds that overweight family firms have better subsequent 
abnormal returns. Dependent variables are monthly performance measures averaged 
in a quarter, in percentage. Style-ad Ret is fund return adjusted by the average of the 
funds in the same Lipper investment style. FFC4 alpha and FFCP5 alpha are 
abnormal returns obtained using Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and five-
factor model, which uses Fama-French-Carhart four-factors in addition to a liquidity 
factor by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Factor loadings are estimated using the 
previous 24 monthly fund returns on a rolling basis. I include only index funds. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Style adj FF holding -0.108 0.480 0.406 
   
 
(-0.08) (0.92) (0.83) 
   Concentrated 
   
0.011 0.056 0.049 
    
(0.09) (1.37) (1.26) 
Turnover -0.017 -0.005 -0.006 -0.017 -0.004 -0.006 
 
(-0.30) (-0.52) (-0.61) (-0.30) (-0.46) (-0.57) 
Expenses -0.082 -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.081 -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 
(-0.57) (-3.57) (-3.57) (-0.55) (-3.68) (-3.65) 
Total load -2.996 0.134 0.048 -3.002 0.199 0.103 
 
(-1.16) (0.21) (0.07) (-1.15) (0.31) (0.16) 
Log (Fund TNA) -0.018 -0.009 -0.008 -0.018 -0.009 -0.008 
 
(-0.92) (-1.52) (-1.36) (-0.90) (-1.53) (-1.37) 
Log (Fund Family TNA) 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.73) (-0.22) (-0.31) (0.74) (-0.18) (-0.28) 
Constant -0.010 0.512*** 0.456*** -0.014 0.512*** 0.456*** 
 
(-0.06) (9.57) (8.24) (-0.08) (9.66) (8.36) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,035 4,992 4,992 5,035 4,992 4,992 





Table A3: Persistence of Funds’ Status of Holdings in Family Firms 
 
Each row shows the likelihood that a fund would rank in quarter Q+1 given its 
ranking in the prior quarter Q. 
 
E.g., in the bottom row, the fund’s holding in family firm rank in the top decile, D10 







  Rank in quarter Q+1 
Rank in Q D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
D1(Bottom) 69.25 18.09 5.37 2.54 1.43 1.12 0.87 0.47 0.47 0.37 
D2 18.01 44.68 20.4 8.01 3.77 2.09 1.47 0.89 0.47 0.21 
D3 5.08 20.78 35.68 19.9 8.88 4.64 2.45 1.22 0.96 0.41 
D4 2.69 8.2 20.65 31.26 19.04 9.13 4.98 2.57 1.11 0.37 
D5 1.44 4.05 9.54 20.63 30.19 19.13 8.41 4.32 1.59 0.63 
D6 0.97 2.44 5.18 9.26 17.86 31.67 20.06 8.33 3.38 0.85 
D7 0.79 1.84 2.5 4.34 8.85 19.68 34.17 20.14 6.37 1.33 
D8 0.51 0.91 1.46 2.57 3.97 8.16 19.32 39.28 20.25 3.59 
D9 0.38 0.47 0.84 1.06 1.87 3.33 5.93 19.47 50.95 15.7 





Table A4: Opacity Measures for (non-) Family Firm 
 
This table compares opacity of family firms versus non-family firms using nine 
















Fraction of 10K Uncertain words   5,580 0.211 10,036 0.200 0.011 11.51 
# of Business Segments 5,176 1.529 9,385 1.473 0.056 3.87 
HHI of sales from Biz Segments 5,176 0.893 9,385 0.887 0.007 1.96 
Amihud Illiquidity (/10000) 5,778 0.052 10,342 0.008 0.043 7.42 
Dollar Volume ($Millions) 5,823 608.4 10,473 1162 -553.6 -11.09 
Bid-Ask Spread 5,823 0.008 10,480 0.006 0.003 13.94 
# of Analyst 3,633 10.234 8,169 12.415 -2.181 -14.29 
Abs (Forecast Error) 3,592 0.005 8,052 0.005 0.000 0.82 





Table A5: Concentrated Funds and Abnormal Fund Performance using 
Alternative Regression Methods 
 
This table presents robustness results using alternative empirical methodology. We 





Where𝐹𝐹𝐶4𝑖,𝑞+1 (𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑃5𝑖,𝑞+1)is average monthly abnormal fund return, adjusted 
by Fama-French-Carhart four factors (Fama-French-Carhart factors plus Pastor-
Stambaugh liquidity factor), in quarter q+1 for fund i.. Concentrated Fund Dummyi,q 
is estimated using fund holdings in the beginning of quarter q (equals to if the fund 
weight in family firms is in the top decile among all funds with the same Lipper fund 
style, otherwise equals to zero). Columns 5 and 6 are taken from Table 2 as a 
comparison with alternative methods in columns 1 to 4.  
 
 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Concentrated 0.060** 0.058** 0.067** 0.063** 0.068*** 0.064*** 
 
(2.33) (2.45) (2.295) (2.098) (4.12) (3.74) 
Turnover -0.030 -0.029 -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 
 
(-1.68) (-1.64) (-2.879) (-2.963) (-5.64) (-5.88) 
Expenses -0.087*** -0.077*** -0.102*** -0.098*** -0.102*** -0.098*** 
 
(-3.24) (-3.76) (-4.388) (-4.112) (-6.74) (-6.52) 
Total load 0.059 -0.083 0.038 -0.031 0.038 -0.030 
 
(0.27) (-0.33) (0.196) (-0.133) (0.16) (-0.13) 
Log (Fund TNA) -0.014** -0.012** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.014*** 
 
(-2.38) (-2.10) (-3.720) (-3.288) (-5.41) (-4.86) 
Log (Fund Family TNA) 0.008** 0.007* 0.008** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(2.04) (1.90) (2.386) (2.166) (3.48) (3.13) 
Constant 0.005 0.003 0.535*** 0.552*** 0.535*** 0.552*** 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (4.239) (4.437) (11.51) (11.17) 
Style Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Dummy 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40 40 71,447 71,447 71,447 71,447 





𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝐹𝐹𝐶4,  𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑃5)𝑖,𝑞+1 
= 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 Dummy𝑖,𝑞 +𝛽2𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜃𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞 , 
